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Résumé : Nous reformulons la question du naturalisme sur le terrain de la
pratique scientifique en privilégiant une analyse épistémologique fine des mé-
thodes, procédures et concepts employés en psychologie. L’enjeu devient alors
opérationnel : celui de la mise en place d’un cadre exact et expérimental per-
mettant de rendre compte de la phénoménologie de l’expérience.
Abstract: We reformulate the issue of naturalism within the realm of sci-
entific practices by suggesting that a fine-grained epistemological analysis of
the methods, procedures and concepts of psychology is needed. The outcome
of this attempt turns out to be operational as it concerns the construction
of an exact and experimental approach that allows one to account for the
phenomenology of mental states and processes.
1 Introduction
The articles published in this volume of Philosophia Scientiæ address specific
issues in contemporary psychological research. They have been collected with
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a singular purpose in mind. The editors share the conviction that the dis-
cussion of tangible research problems ranging from methodological challenges
to epistemological riddles is a more solid foundation for the examination of
various aspects of naturalism than simply adopting one of the many stances
from contemporary philosophies of cognition, general body-mind theories or
what is often referred to as classical (philosophical) phenomenology.
Some of our authors focus partly on the history of modern psychology,
while others draw, more or less freely, on fragments of Gestalt theory or
disparate phenomenological insights but none of the subsequent articles de-
rive their key arguments directly from a specific school of thought, be it
philosophical or psychological. Instead, crucial questions concerning various
facets of naturalism are raised from discussion of factual research situations.
These are questions which demand specific answers, or at least the outline
of such answers.
A rapid “scan” through the essays selected for the present issue is likely
to be misleading or deceiving. The topics chosen by our authors may appear
similar to those conventionally dealt with in academic philosophy, but any
mere appearance is where similarities end. Notwithstanding prima vista im-
pressions, these contributions do not elaborate on diverse matters such as first
person reports, the units of sensory experiences, the impact of judgmental fal-
lacies, etc., in strict continuation with philosophical discussions (e.g., whether
phenomenology exists,1 whether qualia are constitutive of the human mind,
or whether the human mind needs to be accounted for essentially in terms of
computation or Turing machine states run by clever algorithms). This issue is
not the place for debates about grand philosophical theses; nor is it a public
arena where one can observe how an author follows the lead of Daniel Dennett,
for example. This scholar once asserted that, since he was a “philosopher, not
a scientist”, he was also “better at questions than answers” [Dennett 1996,
vii]. Yet, despite limiting himself to questions, his intention was also to posi-
tively and unquestionably “introduce the set of fundamental assumptions that
hold my way together and give it a stable and recognizable pattern” [Dennett
1996, vii]. Our authors refrain from smartly constructing whole philosophies
held together by similar fundamental assumptions. They prefer instead to
tackle problems confronted in, and by, empirical and experimental enquiries
into human mental states and processes of the most variegated kinds.
1. See, for example, the controversy on phenomenology and the human mind in
letters sent to the editors of the Times Literary Supplement and partly published
in no 5843, dated 27 March 2015, p. 6. Note also the remarks sent by Rowland
Malony from Beer (Devon), one of the TLS’s readers, made public on the same page,
relating to this and similar philosophical controversies: “Entertaining for the rest of
us though it is, reading philosophers swatting at each other in your letters page is no
great advertisement for the subject, is it? Would it help if they agreed to make the
acquisition of wisdom and the dissolving of ego the pursuit in future?”
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2 Reorientating the naturalism issue from
an interdisciplinary perspective
Consequently, the question of whether naturalism should be adopted as a
viable research program within philosophy—conceived as a distinct academic
discipline—is clearly not our immediate concern here. In his 1955 presiden-
tial address to the American Philosophical Association, Ernest Nagel already
declared that “the number of distinguishable doctrines for which the word
‘naturalism’ has been a counter in the history of thought is notorious” [Nagel
1955, 3]. Despite a half century of intense technical debate, the meaning of
naturalism remains quite equivocal, and as David Papineau recently admitted,
“[t]he term ‘naturalism’ has no very precise meaning in contemporary philoso-
phy” [Papineau 2007]. The difficulty of firmly determining what philosophical
naturalism is supposed to be or what naturalism really means to philosophy
requires us to doubt its ability to properly address what is really at stake in nat-
uralism. Given that naturalism can be understood, interpreted, and defended
in several ways [Andler 2009a]—even within the realm of cognitive studies and
especially in the philosophy of mind—one is entitled to ask whether the vari-
ety of naturalistic interpretations of mental states and processes results from
philosophers’ temptation to above all satisfy their own interest in speculation
and abstract conceptualization. This applies especially to the body-mind prob-
lem, which still represents the core issue in philosophy of mind. In the attempt
to explain, by the way of a priori reasoning, how the mind in general is an inte-
gral part of the real nature, philosophers have carefully, deliberately and with
great conceptual sophistication outlined abstract ontologies of body-mind rela-
tions (reviewed, e.g., by [Kim 2011] and [Mandik 2014]). This slippery slope of
overconceptualization has revealed an autarkic or disconnected way of think-
ing with respect to a genuine naturalistic approach implying involvement with
the sciences themselves.
A philosopher of mind could of course argue that: (argument 1) philoso-
phy is the right sphere for dealing with naturalism rather than science, since
by vocation it is concerned with highly theoretical, meta-scientific issues, and
that (argument 2) the increasing shift from an ontological to a methodological
naturalism (see [Haug 2014] for recent debates) is intended to overcome suspi-
cions that philosophy (and essentially the philosophy of mind) will inevitably
succeed regardless of the course taken by the sciences.
Argument (1) reveals a misestimation of the conceptual resources of scien-
tific practice. These conceptual resources are actually stronger than is usually
admitted by professional philosophers, which suggests that there is no need
for philosophical help to begin with (contrary to [Thagard 2009]). If experi-
mental and other research practices cut themselves off from theoretical issues,
they risk turning into a blind and guideless data-gathering exercise. Scientific
achievements, the establishment of local frameworks and the emergence of
global research paradigms are all efficient remedies against the prejudice that
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science has neither a normative nor a general dimension without the assistance
of philosophy.2
If, according to argument (2), one admits that, until more or less recent
times, philosophy was extensively nourished by scientific practices—and thus
deeply rooted therein—and if one recognizes that philosophers currently call
for a return to the previous conditions of philosophical practice, then one
cannot avoid challenging the existence of a dividing line between philosophy
and science. Roberto Casati illustrates this trend when he asserts that:
If philosophy is pervasive and continuous with non-philosophical
disciplines, if consequently this dialogue is above all highly inter-
disciplinary, [philosophy] tends to align itself with the standards
of scientific disciplines, and generates strongly contextualized and
localised philosophical problems. [Casati 2006, 27]
However, it is not an easy task to provide an accurate description of what
non-reductive alignment with, and contextualization within the sciences entail
and how philosophico-scientific interactions might yield productive or even
innovative results. Whatever the outcome, the reconstruction of philosophy
along the line of its interactions with the sciences has certain far-reaching
consequences for the present issue.
Concerning the impact of philosophy, it would be nonsensical to grant a
privilege to philosophy in and by itself when considering problems of natural-
ism. Indeed, whatever the consequences for the alleged foundational ontology
of mind and the so-called “naturalistic philosophy”—given that such perspec-
tives are usually a matter addressed by philosophical circles only—, naturalism
primarily concerns epistemological and methodological issues in the sciences.
These issues may of course be addressed either by philosophically minded sci-
entists or by scientifically informed philosophers.3 The editors of the present
issue of Philosophia Scientiæ share the conviction that philosophers of science
2. [Wagemans, Feldman et al. 2012] give a good illustration of what we have in
mind here with regards to our current issue on psychological research. See also the
research program initiated and headed by JohanWagemans at www.gestaltrevision.
be/en/. Another example in the field of neuroscience can be found in [Mausfeld 2012].
3. This integrative approach to the mind-body problem has also been recently
illustrated in a previous issue of the present journal, see [Vacariu & Vacariu 2013].
See in particular the articles [Rolls 2013] and [van Leeuwen 2013] for the first cat-
egory and [Bechtel 2013] and [Theurer & Bickle 2013] for the second. Bechtel and
Bickle are among the main flag-bearers of the emerging research subfield labelled “the
philosophy of neuroscience” which promotes a more scientifically oriented approach
to the philosophical analysis of the mind-body problem (see, for instance, [Bechtel,
Mandik et al. 2001] and [Bickle 2009]).
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are better equipped to perform this task than any philosopher of mind in the
traditional (and academic) sense of the term.4,5
Though we are here concerned with psychological research, it would still be
misleading to talk about the “philosophy of psychology” rather than about the
“philosophy of science”. Indeed, the label “philosophy of psychology” refers to
something that has little to do with the working practices of scientific psycholo-
gists. Gary Hatfield is among the few authors to have noticed this discrepancy:
If the truth be told, though, much of what goes under the title
of “philosophy of psychology” has only a tenuous relation, if any,
to actual scientific psychology. In some cases this arises inno-
cently and understandably from the equivocal use this label per-
mits: some philosophers use the title “philosophy of psychology”
as a catch-all for problems in philosophy of mind. In other cases,
philosophers have appealed to results in scientific psychology to
speak to questions in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of
mind, and even philosophy of science, without making psychology
an object of analysis in its own right. [Hatfield 1994, 19]
Bermudez provides a paradigmatic case of this misleading conception when
he declares that “the philosophy of psychology is the systematic study of the
interplay between philosophical concerns and psychological concerns in the
study of cognition” [Bermudez 2005, 2]. According to this commonly shared
view, the core issue is about the relation between commonsense psychological
explanations and explanations from scientific psychology. This, of course, pre-
supposes a broader conception of psychology than the one available in scientific
psychology as such. Needless to say that, regarding the constant involvement
of philosophy in the course of the long history of scientific psychology [Hatfield
2009, part III], one should be skeptical about the relevance of such a historically
and disciplinary disconnected conception of psychology. Following Lawrence
Shapiro’s ironical remark, “many of the issues that Bermudez [...] [among
many other authors] believe[s] to be central to philosophy of psychology would
be alien to psychologists [...]” [Shapiro 2010, 793]!6
4. Concerning the misguided nature of current debates in philosophy of mind and
the need for fresh start from a more appropriate philosophy of science, see [Horst
2005, 2007].
5. [Bechtel 2009, 565, note 2]: “As philosophers of science engage particular sci-
ences, they often [...] engage in the theoretical issues arising in the science.” Even
though the same author also shares a quite optimistic view on the philosophy of mind’s
ability to have some “potential [!] importance” to cognitive science, see [Bechtel 2010].
6. This remark about philosophy of psychology can be extended to the entire field
of the philosophy of cognitive science as well. We should probably prescribe the same
remedy: “In short, philosophy of cognitive science can also, and perhaps should, be
thought of as a division within the philosophy of science, on par with philosophy of
biology, philosophy of economics, etc. This may seem obvious, but it is not how it is
usually treated” [Andler 2009b, 256].
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But to be quite honest, it must be admitted that the radical significance
of the proposed reorientation on philosophy is rarely assumed in its entirety,
even by promoters or supporters of this integrative approach. For example, in
the introduction of his Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science, Paul
Thagard does agree with Hatfield’s diagnosis while trying to reinvigorate the
lost but senseful understanding of the label “philosophy of psychology”. When
he states that “[t]he philosophy of scientific psychology must be distinguished
from enterprises that have been popular in philosophy: ‘philosophical psychol-
ogy’ and armchair philosophy of mind”, no doubt that he clearly intends “to
sharply distinguish philosophy of psychology and cognitive sciences from ap-
proaches to philosophy of mind that attempt to ignore scientific developments”
as well as from the fake philosophy of psychology. But he doesn’t seem to fully
assume his view when he brings this further precision:
The point of philosophy of psychology is [...] to deal with philo-
sophical issues through close attention to developments in scien-
tific psychology. [Thagard 2007, X]
This means, ultimately, that philosophy retains the priority in its own ques-
tioning while science can be used as a filter for philosophical questions or, at
best, as a means to obtain more satisfying answers. But, if one agrees that
philosophy is not inherently different from science and if the proper goal of phi-
losophy of psychology “is not to develop conceptual truths about the mind”,
as Thagard rightly puts it himself, why should we continue to posit some pre-
existing intrinsically philosophical issues that are not, in the first instance,
interrelated to, motivated by, and raised in scientific ones? In what sense and
to what extent do philosophical issues have to be distinguished from scientific
developments?
It is not a question here of reducing philosophy to science but of recognizing
their true functional interdependence in one way or another (even though some
asymmetry actually remains in knowledge-producing) and at the outset of
any research. Pretending to keep a close contact with sciences by picking up
some ready-made results, artificially importing some experimental methods for
purely philosophical purpose still makes philosophy of psychology an armchair
discipline despite appearances.
Our approach may appear to unfairly misread or even distort the philoso-
phy of mind’s official program. For example, Pete Mandik states that:
Philosophy of mind has also enjoyed prominent interactions with
various empirical sciences in recent debates, especially through
interdisciplinary interactions with the cognitive sciences. Thus
much recent work in philosophy of mind has been informed by
(and to some extent, has informed) advances in psychology, lin-
guistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology.
[Mandik 2010, 1–2]
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Yet, in our view, what is emphatically called “interdisciplinary interactions”
does not go beyond a flatus vocis if these interactions consist of one-side (in-
ter)actions. Surely it is more than a rumor that philosophy of mind is at best
more informed by the sciences than the reverse. Methodological naturalism,
as a theoretical tenet, is more “scientifically” informed and discipline-oriented
towards philosophical issues than philosophically-minded with an orientation
towards the sciences. Once more, it may be thrilling to use the sciences as a
source of inspiration in the pursuit of philosophical goals for their own sake,
but it seems even more thrilling to engage in permanent transactions with the
sciences and thus engage in research which does not lose contact with the prac-
tices of scientists. In any case, our authors have greatly benefited from what
was, and still is, happening within the realm of the sciences, thus attributing
more weight to the problems faced by empirical and experimental research
than to a specific philosophical agenda, whether scientifically informed or not.
Two examples (which are incidentally also interrelated) seem to illustrate
the approach which prevails in the present collection of essays.
3 What is psychophysics really about?
Sketch for a semantic analysis of
sensation
Ever since the end of the nineteenth century, we have repeatedly heard that
scientific psychology—the science established in laboratories, the psychology
which proudly opposed the old armchair psychology, the fruit of thinkers who
believed themselves to be amply equipped to explore the dark continents of
the human and, occasionally, the animal mind—draws its high epistemic status
from psychophysical theorems set forth by Gustav Theodor Fechner. There
is much truth to this well-worn assertion. Fechner provided hypotheses which
enabled the experience of sensory impressions to be referred to the purely
material sphere and the relations between stimuli and sensations to be deter-
mined in mathematical terms and thus to reach a level of articulation which
previous savants like Immanuel Kant thought to be metaphysically impossible.
It is certainly no longer strange to talk of psychophysics as a perfectly well-
accepted branch of research. The founding of The International Society for
Psychophysics in 1984 and the annual Fechner Day held over the past thirty
years7 are further evidence that this tradition is still alive and well.8
However psychophysics, in its commonly known version (i.e., as a subject
matter taught in lectures and seminars offered in colleges and universities),
only represents part of the original paradigm developed by Fechner. There is
7. See http://www.ispsychophysics.org/.
8. In the introduction to his handbook, Christian Bonnet asserts that “the ques-
tions raised by Fechner are still hot topics for current research” [Bonnet 1986, 9].
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no doubt that post-Fechnerian psychophysics underwent subtle adjustments
and that the relations between stimuli and sensations have been further in-
vestigated in a way that he could hardly have anticipated. But this physicist
originally outlined an outer as well as an inner psychophysics. Outer psy-
chophysics covers that which one now commonly subsumes under the denomi-
nation of “psychophysics”, while inner psychophysics, in contradistinction, has
been simply pushed out of sight. There remains practically no trace of it in
the collective memory of today’s psychology communities, except in the form
of a mere psycho-physiology.9 This part of the Fechnerian research program
was intended to precisely determine the relations between internal (or neu-
ral) stimuli and lived sensations. Therefore, this kind of study was initially
far from being circumscribed to the mere investigation of the relation between
neuro-electric responses and the intensity of sensation as is often believed when
this section of Fechner’s program is deemed worthy of mention. It originally
took psychological processes into account and not just their physiological and
anatomical counterparts [Fechner 1860, 11], [Fechner 1877, 3].10
Does it really matter, however, whether Fechner’s initial research program
was forgotten [Scheerer 1987] after having been cut in two? Does it really
matter, considering the fact that one half of it not only promoted relevant
theories, but also proved to be acceptably successful for nearly a century and
a half? It certainly does not matter to those who unknowingly mistake one
half of the research program for the entire project.11 It would, however, mat-
ter to those who prefer not to easily stick with the everyday habits of normal
science and who have enough curiosity to ask questions like “What’s the equiv-
alent of a physically defined stimulus of the outer world for a stimulus—let’s
say: of proprioceptive origin—considered from the point of view of inner psy-
chophysics?” Moving beyond normal psychophysics to study sensations which
are the result of some kind of physical stimulus, but certainly, as is the case
with phosphenes, do not relate to outer stimuli, e.g., unabsorbed lightwaves,
compels us to deal with specific problems of methodology, experimentation
9. For a short presentation of Fechner’s inner psychophysics and its relevance
for current cognitive sciences, see [Scheerer 1992]. Murray’s attempt to show the
existence of a line of research from inner psychophysics to modern signal detection
theory should also be mentioned [Murray 1993], though this attempt is rooted in a
rather vague historical narrative allowing for many approximations (see [Gundlach
1993b] for critical comments).
10. For further developments on Fechner’s psychophysics as a whole project, see, if
not exclusively, Gundlach’s incomparably well executed historical and epistemological
account of Fechnerian psychophysics [Gundlach 1993a].
11. Furthermore, what is now meant by “psychophysics” refers more to a mere set
of techniques integrated to experimental psychology and sensory physiology than to
a genuine discipline (see [Farell & Pelli 1999] and [Ehrenstein & Ehrenstein 1999] for
reviews). In short, the modern psychophysical approach follows at least these two
criteria: careful experimentation (controlled stimuli, reliable task) and data analysis
(psychometric functions, statistical tools).
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and measurement which are usually ignored in normal post-Fechnerian psy-
chophysics, if we discard their dilution into mere physiological investigations.
Yet, there is no need to look back to the era of Fechner and some of his
early followers to notice that normal, conventional (i.e., outer) psychophysics
is unlikely to address the totality of the phenomena it claims to explain. The
starting point of outer psychophysics is the correlation between physical stim-
ulus and sensory response but physical stimulus does not cover all of what is
perceived—it is clearly difficult to consider bistable or multistable phenomena
from a purely psychophysical point of view:12 there is a perceptual variation
which does not rely upon a correlative variation in physical parameters.
Let us take, for example, the unsurprisingly trivial experience one un-
dergoes when contemplating reversible figures like the Necker cube or Rubin
vase, also known as the Rubin face (see figure 1).13 Here is a description of
what happens (realistically) when one looks at the Rubin face/vase figure un-
der constant external conditions (with no increment of luminosity occurring).
One perceives either a vase against a black background or two faces in profile
facing one another on two sides of a white background. In addition, the per-
ceived content of the same surface reverses from one “meaning” to the other
“meaning”, i.e., from opposite faces to vase, or vice versa. Moreover, when
we carefully look at what happens in the course of this visual experience, it
clearly may be fairly difficult to stop the figure from reversing automatically.
It seems as if the figure has reversed under the impact of some physiological
agent unbeknown to the subject.
According to classical theorems drawn from Fechner’s outer psychophysics,
reversible figures should be ontologically barren from occurrence. Indeed, the
stimulus remains the same throughout the experience of the Rubin face/vase
figure. Hence, the sensation should in turn remain the same, too. This kind of
paradoxical experiential and experimentally tested outcome ought to be taken
seriously at face value and received as a welcome opportunity to reconsider
certain significant semantic and epistemic issues in psychological research.14
12. See [Strother, Van Valkenburg et al. 2003] and [Kubovy & Gepshtein 2003] for
reviews of Michael Kubovy’s decisive works on that issue.
13. For further details on Rubin’s approach, see [Rubin 1915]. [Pind 2014, 90–109]
has recently presented in English the main results of Rubin’s doctoral dissertation.
14. Let us note that the figure/ground assignment remains a hot topic for exper-
imental psychology which has, until now, analyzed the relevant perceptual group-
ing cues to include symmetry [Bahnsen 1928], parallelism [Metzger 1936], convexity
[Kanizsa & Gerbino 1976], edge-region grouping [Palmer & Brookes 2008], extremal
edges [Palmer & Ghose 2008], etc., i.e., cues which are said to determine the fig-
ure/ground organization. In addition, experimental psychology studies the impact
of lower-regions in a visual scene [Vecera, Vogel et al. 2002] upon the figures so that
they appear phenomenologically closer to the observer, or the top-down influence of
higher-order processes (such as object-recognition and attention) on figure assign-
ment (see [Rock 1975], [Peterson 1994] and [Peterson & Gibson 1993]) to mention
only some examples of more or less current research.
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Figure 1: A Rubin-type reversible figure
The sketchy reconstruction of the case of Rubin’s reversible figures draws
our attention to one concept of psychological research, namely the concept
of sensation. The concept of sensation is highly controversial in the history
of psychophysics. But it seems hard to discard sensation from psychophysics
without compromising its psychological relevance (see [Shapiro 1994]). Viewed
in terms of the traditional approach to psychophysics, seeing two faces and
then seeing one vase (or vice versa) reflects a theoretically paradoxical situa-
tion, since a constant stimulus cannot be the cause of two distinct sensations.
But, conversely how could a single, stable, and unchanging stimulus provoke
two distinct, and distinguishable, sensations? If we closely consider the high
frequency of reports on subjects who see two faces and/or a vase (while figure
and ground reverse depending on whether you see a vase or two faces first),
we could alternatively hypothesize that the stimulus (the whole figure with
its physical parameters objectively presented to the subject) remains constant
while the sensation (i.e., the psychologically relevant state called “sensation”
in traditionally taught psychophysics) presents either two faces or a vase. This
evidence is doomed to remain a mystery if that which is perceived is reduced
exclusively to the physical parameters of the one, unchanging stimulus. The
investigation of phenomena requires that a distinction be made between (a)
the object of sensations (such as the figure presented to the subject with all
its physical, purely objective, neutral or subject-independent properties) and
(b) the content of sensations (such as the figure of a vase or the figure of
two faces as perceived by a subject and phenomenologically grasped with no
consideration for the subject’s assumptions concerning the realness of the prop-
erties of the object at stake). The paradox of reversing sensations (in terms
of post-Fechnerian psychophysics) may thus be due to a definition of “sensa-
tion” which is either too loose or broad and thus implies that whatever one
sees, hears, smells, feels by touch, etc., is conventionally subsumed under the
term. This is despite the fact that so-called “sensations” may be quite diverse
insofar as they are (a) considered from a purely objective or idealised stand-
point (as if our sensory states can be strictly correlated to some determined
and constant physical features of the stimuli) and (b) insofar as they are being
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experienced by subjects. In other words, traditional psychophysics, as received
and enlarged by post-Fechnerian scholars, may cause all sorts of problems for
itself. It is likely, indeed, that it confounds that which it unravels by methodi-
cally organized research acts with the fully-fledged thing it intends to unravel.15
4 The phenomenological requiredness:
a scientific concern and prospect
However, phenomena such as following the movements made by afterimages
in one’s visual field, perceiving first a vase and then two faces (or vice versa),
seeing phosphenes in an absolutely dark room, noticing auras at the onset
of migraines, or feeling different kinds of pains in one’s forearm or in the
abdomen, are too intrinsically bound to one’s own streams of perceptual ex-
perience to fit any a priori framework, be it philosophical or not. These
phenomena are observable only to the person who “experiences” them, to put
it crudely. They occur inside the subject, whereby the word “inside” is both
used metaphorically and in a possibly misleading way. The least one would
have to acknowledge, however, is that these phenomena, if made the content
of propositions, are uttered, expressed and possibly described in first per-
son reports. These reports may turn out to be insufficiently concise (a subject
may correct her/himself while thinking twice about the phenomenon at stake),
and yet, due to their reference to the stance “from within”, they have to be
taken into account for what they are—a source of first-hand distinctions be-
tween various kinds of mental states that one lives through, sometimes against
one’s will (as with patches of itchy skin) and which sometimes become the fo-
cus of sustained attention (as has often happened in experimental studies of
afterimages since 1750).
Research in psychology cannot (or rather must not) ignore subjects notic-
ing, perceiving, feeling and perhaps suffering pain. For without the study
of such experiences, we would not sense what it is like not to be someone
else. However it would be an error to infer from this assumption that one’s
own perspective on one’s “inner” mental life will yield genuine psychological
knowledge under any circumstance. Some exercises in introspection quickly
show with a high degree of reliability that some mental states and/or processes
are easily graspable, whereas other such mental states and/or processes tend
to remain indiscernible notwithstanding the efforts of self-observation under-
taken by subjects. Let us return to the example of the Rubin vase. Does the
black part of this figure cause one or several sensations? Should one identify
what one perceives as the black and the white parts of the figure with two
15. We here overtly allude to a passage of Theodor W.Adorno’s introduction to
the sociology of music: “one realizes that the division of scientific labor causes the
“Verwechslung des methodisch Veranstalteten mit der Sache selbst [...]” [Adorno
1973, 397].
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distinct visual impressions or several of the same or should one say perhaps
that there is a set of fuzzy single impressions which combine into a figure? If
we consider either of the two faces then the nose is easily distinguishable from
the mouth. But, do we now have two elements of a profile, or do we rather
see a nose and a mouth which, in turn, are made of little bits of a nose and
fragments of a mouth, respectively. And what about the dozens of feelings,
moods, and similar states of mind which appear hard to characterize with
the sufficient precision a subject either desires or is required to attain by a
physician, psychotherapist or judge?
Being aware of one’s mental states and processes needs to be characterized
epistemologically as a key to psychological research. Yet this key alone is
by all means far from being sufficient. The character of reports of mental
states and processes is both an unsettled and an exciting challenge. Indeed,
what do psychologists study when using, for example, first person reports on
sensory experiences? Do they confront sensory data rather than linguistic data,
which refers to subjects’ having perceptions? To what extent a psychologist
is committed, in a way or another, to the language of perception? On the
contrary, should he/she reduce the verbal report, as far as possible, to a yes/no
response, in order to get the unbiased and online process by which the subject
is performing the task? Are psychologists capable of solving the problem of
disentangling the content of first person reports on sensory data, on the one
hand, from the content of sensory data as experienced by subjects, on the
other? If, for whatever epistemological reason, we assume that we cannot
do without first person reports to begin with, the problem at hand seems to
be intractable without other strategies enabling researchers to move beyond
such reports on sensory perception—and on other so-called “private” mental
states and processes, like pain, itches, dreams, etc. (we readily admit that the
adjective “private” is most likely a misnomer).
Hence, since most mental phenomena experienced by subjects are neither
self-explicatory nor always fully graspable, and since such lacunae often do
not escape the observation of subjects themselves,16 psychological research
needs to coordinate phenomenal experiences with research methods of various
kinds—be they physiological, psycho-somatic, social psychological, and so on.
This kind of coordination (past and present) is the key topic of the papers
collected for the present issue.17
16. [Schumann 1900] indicates how useful self-observation can be, as a research
method, to discover new effects or phenomena. But he also recognizes how difficult it
is to find observers with such a fine and accurate ability. Furthermore, one must admit
that some phenomenal concepts are intrinsically hard to describe by themselves, as
it is the case with “the visual field” (see [Koenderink, van Doorn et al. 2015]).
17. See also [Ehrenstein, Spillmann et al. 2003] and [Spillmann 2009] on the relation
between phenomenology and neuroscience, and [Pinna 2010] for a mutual enlighten-
ment between phenomenology and outer psychophysics. We set aside the question
whether or not a descriptive (pre-)science (?) (such as experimental phenomenology)
can also explain—and not only describe—the modes of appearing of perceptual phe-
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A single example may illustrate the overall approach focused upon here.
Take the commonly reported, examined, and diagnosed phenomenon of nega-
tive scotoma in migraines. This consists of an “area of partial or total blind-
ness which may follow, or, on occasion, precede a scintillating scotoma” [Sacks
1971, 79]. This phenomenon is no doubt accessible to the person experienc-
ing it because (trivially) otherwise it would not be noticed. In addition, it is
topic of many first person reports. Given medical, paramedical, and everyday
encounters with migraines in various individual and social contexts, these first
person reports are easily turned into third person reports. The phenomenon
itself has been selected (and continues to be selected) as a topic of hot medical
research.
Figure 2: Variants of migraine scotoma. From: [Sacks 1971, 78]
Though avalanches of scotoma-linked visual sensations may vary from per-
son to person, in principle at least they are suitable for iconical typification
and representation as an illustration in Oliver Sacks’s monograph on migraines
clearly shows (see figure 2).
Migraines are examples of the undeniable feeling of something wrong more
often than not combined with a temporal and intermediate acceleration of peri-
staltic movements, spasms, decreasing or increasing secretion, an unstable and
fluctuating nervous system, and varying degrees of headache. The scotoma,
whether scintillating or negative, thus turns out to be embedded in a huge
number of organic processes which extend, so to speak, from the skin to the
belly to the eyes and the whole nervous system. Given such all-encompassing
bodily conditions, it would certainly be an epistemological error to reduce the
mental phenomenon of a scotoma either to how it is described as an experience
(“private” in nature, seeing scintillating or more or less enduring blind spots
in one’s visual field) or to systematically discard that which is accessible only
to the experiencing person.
However this example of course does not mean that all mental states and
processes are suitable for the same types of first and third person reports, the
nomena. This strategy has been promoted by [Metzger 1936, 1941], [Kanizsa 1980,
1991], [Bozzi 1989], [Bianchi & Davies In preparation], [Vicario 1993], and more re-
cently [Albertazzi 2011, 2012, 2013].
16 Charles-Édouard Niveleau & Alexandre Métraux
same experimental designs developed for further studies, the same explanatory
schemata and the same patterns of psychological theories.
The approach that we prefer to adopt, then, in studies of regional or even
local epistemology is to take single cases of psychological research as a starting
point for study of the methods used in field and lab experiments and the critical
determination of which kinds of concepts are at stake.
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